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Before International Tax Reform,
We Need to Understand Why
Firms Invert

ISSUE BRIEF
VOLUME 5
NUMBER 8
SEPTEMBER 2017

Michael S. Knoll, JD, PhD

Corporate inversions—cross-border acquisitions in which a U.S. corporation
acquires a foreign target in such a manner that the foreign corporation emerges as
the parent of the group, with the U.S. corporation as a wholly owned subsidiary—
have generated substantial debate in academic, business and policy circles.
Many critics of corporate inversions have described
inverting companies as “unpatriotic”1 for shirking
their obligations to pay their fair share of taxes; they
have applauded federal action to stem corporate
inversions and have called for further restrictions.2
By some estimates, there is as much as $2.4 trillion
in untaxed profits ($1 trillion of which is in cash)
held abroad by U.S. corporations that could escape
taxation if inversions were freely permitted.3 Some
critics also argue that inversions have to be stopped
because inverted companies are likely to move their
headquarters offshore and shift their employment,
investment, and research and development away from
the United States.4
In contrast with these critics, managers of inverting corporations protest that they are not the villains
they have been made out to be, but rather are the
victims of an unfair and antiquated U.S. tax system
that dates from a time when business was much more
national than international.5 These managers blame
the U.S. tax laws—which, they say, hamper their
ability to compete with foreign rivals6—and call for
fundamental tax reform, including the elimination of
U.S. taxation of active foreign income.7 At the center
of their complaint, U.S. multinational corporations

SUMMARY
• A wave of corporate inversions by U.S. firms over the past
two decades has generated substantial debate in academic,
business, and policy circles.
• The core of the debate hinges on a couple of key economic
questions: Do U.S. tax laws disadvantage U.S.-domiciled companies relative to their foreign competitors? And, if so, do
inversions improve the competitiveness of U.S. multinational
firms both abroad and at home?
• There is unfortunately little, if any, empirical work directly
determining whether U.S.-based MNCs are currently taxdisadvantaged compared to their foreign rivals, or measuring
the amount by which (if any) U.S.-based MNCs improve their
competitive position by inverting.
• This brief, however, summarizes both old and new research
that views these questions through the lens of corporations’
global effective tax rates (ETRs), and finds that the stronger
case seems to be that U.S.-domiciled corporations are often
tax-disadvantaged and that they can improve their competitive
position by inverting.
• Additional evidence also suggests that U.S. MNCs can increase
their after-tax cash flow by inverting.
• Inversions indicate that something is fundamentally wrong with
the tax system. The brief concludes by discussing two feasible
paths forward for reform.
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(MNCs) claim that they are taxed
more heavily than their foreign rivals
on the same income.8 By inverting,
U.S.-domiciled companies avoid the
U.S. tax system’s disadvantageous
treatment of resident businesses and
place themselves on the same footing
as their overseas competitors.
Proponents of this view argue
that, as long as the U.S. tax system
continues to favor foreign ownership over domestic ownership of
corporate assets, if U.S. companies
are prevented from inverting through
transactions that allow the U.S. parent
to retain control, they would instead
become takeover targets for foreign
corporations. Such takeovers, they
claim, would likely produce larger
shifts in headquarters, employment,
investment, and R&D away from the
United States than would inversions.9
In considering these competing views, the central factual issue
is whether the U.S. tax laws disadvantage U.S.-domiciled companies
relative to their foreign competitors
domiciled in countries with territorial tax systems. In a 2014 article,
one prominent industry practitioner
and researcher asserted “international
business ‘competitiveness’ has nothing to do with the reasons for these
deals.”10 His article has been cited

for contending that U.S.-domiciled
companies are not tax-disadvantaged
relative to their foreign competitors
and that U.S.-domiciled companies
do not improve their competitive
position by inverting.11 That article,
among others, has led many tax
experts to advocate for the United
States to move its international tax
system further away from those of its
major trading partners by adopting
“a true worldwide tax system—without deferral.”12 (The U.S. currently
has a worldwide tax system with
deferral, which has been derogatively
described as an “ersatz territorial tax
system.”13)
Ultimately, the claim that U.S.
MNCs are on a tax par with their
foreign rivals is an empirical one.
Unfortunately, there is little, if any,
empirical work directly determining whether U.S.-based MNCs
currently are tax-advantaged, taxdisadvantaged, or roughly on par with
their foreign rivals, or measuring the
amount by which (if any) U.S.-based
MNCs improve their competitive
position by inverting.14 That said,
the stronger case seems to be that
U.S.-domiciled corporations are often
tax-disadvantaged relative to their
non-U.S. rivals and that they can
improve their competitive position by

inverting.
This is a policy problem because
inversions are an indicator that
some part of the tax system is poorly
designed and potentially malfunctioning. This brief will explore the primary
tax considerations that companies
evaluate when making the decision to
invert; highlight some key data from
past inversions that shed light on
management expectations of inversions; and discuss two policy avenues
for addressing, in whole or in part, the
ongoing use of corporate inversions.

PRIMARY MOTIVATIONS FOR
INVERTING
There are two potential competitiveness arguments, or accounts, that
can be made about inversions. U.S.based MNCs might invert to improve
their ability to compete with their
foreign rivals for opportunities outside
the United States (the outbound
account) or inside the United States
(the inbound account). Importantly,
these two accounts are largely independent of one another. There is also
a third account for inversions,
although not strictly about competitiveness, that is closely related to the
outbound account.

NOTES
E.g., Max Baucus, “Corporate Tax Shelters: Looking Under
the Roof,” Senate Finance Committee Hearing, 107th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1.
2 E.g., in reference to inversions, Rep. Peter Welch, D-Vt.,
quoted in Renae Merle’s article, “Obama Criticizes Companies That Leave U.S. for Lower Taxes,” WashingtonPost.
com, Apr. 5, 2016 (“We’re just hemorrhaging the resources
that we need from companies to pay their fair share.”).
3 Citizens for Tax Justice, “Fortune 500 Companies Hold a
Record $2.4 Trillion Offshore” (Mar 3, 2016) ($2.4 trillion
unrepatriated profits of U.S. MNCs); Eric Platt, “Top 50
1

Boardroom Hoarders Sit on $1 Trillion in Cash,” Financial
Times, May 11, 2015 (citing a company analysis that U.S.
companies hold about $1.1 trillion in cash overseas).
Those earnings are often said to be “locked out” of the
United States.
4 E.g., Jeff Malehorn, “Why Corporate Headquarters Matter
to Chicago,” World Business Chicago, Feb. 16, 2016.
5 E.g., Walter Galvin, “Why Corporate Inversions Are All the
Rage,” The Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2014.
6 E.g., Bret Wells, “What Corporate Inversions Teach About
International Tax Reform,” Tax Notes, June 21, 2010, p.

2

1345 (arguing that the corporate inversions provide “clear
and noncontroversial evidence” that non-U.S. MNCs have a
tax advantage over U.S.-domiciled MNCs in both U.S. and
foreign markets).
7 Galvin, supra note 5.
8 Joshua Simpson, “Analyzing Corporate Inversions and
Proposed Changes to the Repatriation Rule,” 68 N.Y.U. Ann.
Surv. Am. L. 673, 703 (2013). See also Wells, supra note 11.
9 Testimony of Michelle Hanlon, the Howard W. Johnson
Professor at the MIT Sloan School of Management, before
the House Ways and Means Committee, at 3-4 (Feb. 24,

publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu

IMPROVING COMPETITIVENESS
ABROAD

The “outbound account” describes
how inversions operate as a selfhelp mechanism U.S. corporations
use to achieve territorial taxation
and hence eliminate the competitive
disadvantage they have with foreign
rivals.15 Under U.S. law, the active
non-U.S. income earned directly by a
U.S. corporation (or by a branch, an
unincorporated entity owned by a U.S.
corporation) is taxed by the United
States as it is earned, whereas the
active foreign income earned by a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. parent corporation is taxed by the United States
only when that income is repatriated
to the United States.16 Thus, the U.S.
tax system encourages U.S. companies
with foreign-source income that has
not been taxed at a rate as high as the
U.S. statutory tax rate to earn income
through a foreign corporation and
then defer repatriation.
In contrast with the United States
and its worldwide tax system, most
countries use territorial tax systems
that exempt the active foreign income
of domestic corporations. The argument that inversions by U.S. firms are
a rational response to the disadvantage of worldwide taxation begins by
recognizing that U.S. tax law considers

a corporation to be domiciled where
it is incorporated (regardless of the
extent of its activities in that location).17 Thus, a firm incorporated in
the United States is a U.S. corporation and is subject to worldwide
taxation on its income; in contrast, a
firm incorporated outside the United
States is a non-U.S. corporation and
is subject to U.S. taxation only on its
income from U.S. sources. Moreover,
if a non-U.S. corporation is domiciled in a country that has a territorial
tax system, it generally will not pay
home-country tax on active income
earned outside its home jurisdiction.
Following an inversion, the parent
of the group is a non-U.S. corporation, while the U.S. corporation that
inverted is still a U.S. corporation. At
this point, corporate groups often use
a variety of tax planning techniques
to shift income that would otherwise be taxed by the United States to
the non-U.S. parent (or to non-U.S.
corporations that are not subsidiaries of a U.S. corporation) in order to
avoid ever subjecting that income to
tax by the United States. These tactics
include shifting income from subsidiaries of a U.S. corporation to corporations that are not subsidiaries of a U.S.
corporation,18 allowing the businesses
operated by subsidiaries of a U.S. cor-

poration to wither while growing the
businesses operated by subsidiaries of
the foreign parent,19 and extensively
using borrowing and other “hopscotch
techniques” that shift cash and income
from foreign subsidiaries of the U.S.
corporation to the foreign parent
without passing through the U.S. corporation.20 To the extent that those
tactics are effective, the foreign-source
income of the U.S. corporation is,
after the inversion, no longer subject
to U.S. tax. That, in turn, reduces the
tax-induced competitive disadvantage
experienced by U.S. corporations in
foreign markets.

Address Current Tax Reform Efforts in Congress,” at 3
(Sept. 25, 2015).
13 Kleinbard, supra note 10, p. 1056.
14 See testimony of Leslie Robinson, associate professor, Tuck
School of Business at Dartmouth University, before the
Finance Committee, “The U.S. Tax Code: Love It, Leave It,
or Reform It!” (July 22, 2014).
15 It should be noted that the comparatively high U.S. statutory corporate tax rate of 35 percent—the highest among
OECD countries—does not enter directly into the argument
that the U.S. tax system disadvantages U.S.-domiciled

MNCs relative to their foreign rivals. The relatively high
U.S. corporate tax rate exacerbates that disadvantage but
does not cause it. The disadvantage comes from the U.S.
worldwide tax system, which subjects foreign income to
U.S. taxation.
16 Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 954(c).
17 A notable exception to this general rule is IRC section
7874, which treats a foreign corporation as a U.S. corporation if the owners of the U.S. corporation own more than
80 percent of the combined entity after a merger of a U.S.
corporation and a foreign corporation.

IMPROVING COMPETITIVENESS
AT HOME

A second argument, the “inbound
account,” has been getting more
attention recently. It holds that
inversions improve the ability of U.S.
companies to compete with nonU.S.-based MNCs for investments in
the United States.
Large, successful U.S. corporations are taxed at what is an effectively flat rate of 35 percent. Income,
however, is a net concept, and as has
long been recognized, interest and
royalty payments are very effective in
shifting the source of income for tax
purposes but otherwise have no eco-

NOTES
2016). See also statement of Peter R. Merrill, principal,
PwC, hearing before the Senate Finance Committee, 113th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 7-8 (July 22, 2014).
10 Edward D. Kleinbard, “‘Competitiveness’ Has Nothing to Do
With It,” Tax Notes, Sept. 1, 2014, p. 1055.
11 E.g., Avi-Yonah and Omri Y. Marian, “Inversions and Competitiveness: Reflections in the Wake of Pfizer-Allergan,”
41 Int’l Tax J. 39, 40 (Nov.-Dec. 2015). See also Marian,
“Home-Country Effects of Corporate Inversions,” 90 Wash.
L. Rev. 1, 10 n.44 (2015).
12 Americans for Tax Fairness, “24 International Tax Experts

3

publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu

to their large offshore stores of cash
(i.e., prior overseas earnings), presumably to repurchase shares and raise
their stock price. This is not a wholly
independent reason, as it is very similar
to the outbound account, which claims
that companies invert in order to
reduce the tax burden on their future
overseas earnings. Both explanations
are clearly predicated on the value of
reaching earnings held offshore, which
are worth more to the company, its
managers, and investors when they can
be freely accessed without additional
tax cost. The difference between these
two explanations is merely timing. The
competitiveness argument simply takes
a step back in time and recognizes that
before profits are earned, they will be
worth more if they can be accessed
immediately or whenever desired
without having to incur a repatriation tax.21 The difference is notable,
however. Not all inverting companies
already hold large offshore stocks of
cash, and some high-profile proposed
inversions, such as Walgreen’s aborted
inversion, involve companies with little
offshore cash.22

nomic significance when transfers are
made within the same group of companies (as long as the ultimate ownership is the same). Because of this, there
is opportunity in practice for foreign
parents to capitalize U.S. subsidiaries with debt (instead of equity), thus
lowering U.S. income taxes (by the
amount of the interest payments) and
increasing (interest) income abroad,
where it is taxed at a lower rate.
There is an important difference
when foreign-based MNCs engage in
income shifting and when U.S.-based
MNCs do so. A non-U.S. corporation that strips income out from the
United States permanently escapes
U.S. tax on that income. In contrast,
a U.S. corporation that strips income
out from the United States only
defers (possibly indefinitely) that
income from U.S. worldwide taxation.
Accordingly, non-U.S.-based MNCs
can have a tax-induced competitive
advantage over U.S. companies in
the competition to own assets, make
investments, and take advantage of
opportunities in the United States.
A FINAL (BUT SIMILAR) MOTIVATION

KEY (TAX RATE) DATA

A third reason for why companies
choose to invert—one that is not based
on future competitiveness—is that
U.S. MNCs are seeking to gain access

Any claim that U.S.-based MNCs
are not at a competitive disadvantage

relative to their foreign rivals rests on
the premise that when properly viewed
through the lens through which businesses make investment or capital budgeting decisions, U.S.-based MNCs are
taxed no more heavily than their foreign rivals. Indeed, this is an argument
that the incremental tax is not merely
small, but that it is non-positive.
This is a difficult claim to prove
empirically, not least of all because
there is substantial diversity in the
way businesses incorporate taxes
into their decision-making.23 Thus,
some companies might use a financial
accounting approach, whereas others use a cash flow approach, and still
others likely use both approaches.24
Such a wide divergence in practice
makes it difficult to describe precisely
how taxes affect the capital budgeting
decisions of U.S.-domiciled corporations, which in turn makes it more
difficult to draw strong conclusions
about how taxes affect the capital
budgeting decisions of U.S.-domiciled
MNCs relative to those of foreigndomiciled MNCs.
With this caveat in mind, my
research examines both the financial
accounting approach (using ETRs,
or effective tax rates) and cash flow
approach (using MTRs, or marginal
tax rates). In each case, I assume that

NOTES
Transfer pricing restrictions are imperfect.
Kleinbard, supra note 10, p. 1067.
20 Id., p. 1065-1066. To some extent, these techniques have
been curtailed over the last several years.
21 The same relationship holds for the inbound argument.
Kleinbard argues that U.S. MNCs strip income out of the
United States and into low-tax jurisdictions and that U.S.
MNCs invert to access prior earnings without additional
tax. According to the inbound competitiveness argument,
U.S. MNCs invert to access their future U.S. earnings more
easily and cheaply.
18
19

Felipe Cortes et al., “The Effect of Inversions on Corporate
Governance” (Oct. 25, 2016).
23 Graham et al., “Tax Rates and Corporate Decision Making,” working paper (Jan. 2017) (roughly 750 companies
provided usable responses).
24 Graham et al. asked tax executives what tax rate their business “primarily” used, making it unlikely that companies
using more than one tax rate would indicate that they use
multiple tax rates.
25 The ETR is the average rate at which a company’s pre-tax
profits are taxed. It is calculated by dividing the taxes a
22

4

company paid by its total taxable income. The MTR is
the present value of the incremental taxes to be paid if a
project is undertaken, divided by the present value of the
project’s net cash flow. That tax rate reflects both when that
cash flow is taxed and the rate at which it is taxed.
26 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Yaron Lahav, “The Effective Tax
Rates of the Largest U.S. and EU Multinationals,” 6 Tax L.
Rev. 375 (2012); PwC, “Global Effective Tax Rates” (April
14, 2011); and Kevin Markle & Douglas S. Shackelford,
“Cross-Country Comparisons of Corporate Income Taxes,”
65 Nat’l Tax J. 493.
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tently and uniformly show substantial
declines in global ETRs following
inversions, with the savings likely
arising from both U.S. and foreign
markets.29 After 2004, the target
corporation could no longer be a shell;
instead, the inversion had to involve
a substantial target corporation with
significant assets and business activity. Those rules, which have been
expanded and tightened since 2004,
have made it more difficult for U.S.
MNCs to find an appropriate target
for inversion. Also, since 2005, when
the repatriation holiday ended, successful U.S. MNCs have been piling
up cash overseas in apparent anticipation of a new holiday and they have
become more effective in shifting
income overseas. Thus, one might be

domestic and foreign MNCs incorporate taxes into their decision-making
in the same manner (potentially differing only in the rates they use).25
EFFECTIVE TAX RATES

I first examine the financial accounting approach, as the ETR is the
tax rate most often referenced during public debate over inversions.
Although several studies find that
U.S.-domiciled MNCs have no higher
global ETRs than MNCs domiciled
in the rest of the world,26 when one
digs more deeply into those studies,
one finds that on average U.S.-domiciled MNCs have higher global ETRs
than do MNCs domiciled in most
other market-oriented countries.27
In particular, many U.S.-domiciled
MNCs in the pharmaceuticals industry, an industry that has experienced
many highly publicized inversions,
have higher global ETRs than their
foreign-domiciled rivals.28
There are also studies of specific
inverting firms and the impact of
inverting on their ETRs. Before 2004,
U.S. MNCs could invert through socalled “naked inversions,” whereby the
U.S. company could change residence
by merging into a shell corporation
registered in another jurisdiction.
Studies using pre-2004 data consis-

TABLE 1:

reluctant to draw conclusions about
the current situation from studies
based on pre-2004 inversions.
Unfortunately, there are only a few
recent studies of the effect of inverting
on corporations’ global ETRs, and the
studies that are available are neither
uniform in their conclusions nor
entirely convincing on the impact of
inverting on a company’s global ETR.
Even so, most recent studies suggest
(and are generally consistent with)
the notion that many U.S.-domiciled
companies lower their global ETRs by
inverting.30
Another approach to the question
of the expected effect of inverting on
an MNC’s global ETR is to see what
the management of an inverting company publicly say they expect to hap-

MANAGEMENT EXPECTATIONS ABOUT POST-INVERSION ETRS

Company

Year of Inversion

Pre-Inversion ETR

Expected ETR

Steris Corp.

2015

32%

25%

Applied Materials

2015 (Canceled)

22%

17%

Johnson Controls

2016

29%

18-19%

Waste Connections Inc.

2016

40%

27%

Baxalta

2016

23-24%

16-17%

Pfizer

2016 (Canceled)

25%

17-18%

CF Industries Holdings Inc.

2016 (Canceled)

35%

20%

NOTES
PwC, “Global Effective Tax Rates,” supra note (U.S-domiciled. MNCs had higher global ETRs than MNCs from all the
other countries studied except for Japan and Germany);
and Markle & Shackelford, supra note. (U.S-domiciled.
MNCs had higher global ETRs than MNCs from all the other
countries studied except for Japan) See also Martin A. Sullivan “Untangling Corporate Effective Tax Rates,” Tax Notes
1299, Mar. 16, 2015 (summarizing Avi-Yonah & Lahav,
PwC and Markle-Shackelford studies).
28 PwC, “Pharma 2020: Taxing Times Ahead” 7, figure 5
(2009).

27

29

Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, “Expectations and
Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and Consequences of
Corporate Inversions, 55 Nat’l Tax J. 4009 (2002) (concluding that there were both outbound and inbound tax
savings from inversions); Jim A Seida & William F. Wempe,
“Effective Tax Rate Changes and Earnings Stripping Following Corporate Inversion,” 57 Nat’l Tax J. 805 (2004)
(finding tax savings from inverting, most of which could be
attributed to earnings stripping); Bret Wells, “What Corporate Inversions Teach About International Tax Reform,” Tax
Notes 1345, June 21, 2010 (three oil services companies

5

that inverted in 2002 found their global ETRs fall by between 7 and 16 percent).
30 Doron Narotzki, The True Economic Effects of Corporate
Inversions, Tax Notes 1819, June 27, 2016 (finding large
drops in global ETRs following inversions for firms regardless of size); Elizabeth Chorvat, “Expectations and Expatriations: A Long-Run Event Study,: University of Chicago
Public Law working paper no. 445 (Sept. 20, 2015) (finding
that inverting firms produce excess returns that can be attributed to intangibles held offshore, but cannot distinguish
between tax savings or undervaluation of those assets
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pen to their firm’s global ETR after
inverting. I looked at the inversion
transactions announced since 2015
to see what management said about
expected future tax rates (see Table 1).
Although not all inverting companies
publicly stated that they expected a
decline in their global ETRs, many
did.31
Viewed through the lens of corporations’ global ETRs, the claim that
inverting U.S.-domiciled companies do
not improve their competitive position by inverting is not supported by
the data and is inconsistent with most
studies. However, that approach buries
all the hard questions about how U.S.
companies and their foreign rivals are
taxed by subsuming those questions
under a single, widely available number
— the global ETR. The main problem
with that approach is that it is unclear
why multinational companies, especially MNCs operating in countries
with very different tax systems and tax
rates, should make capital budgeting
decisions in individual markets using
global ETRs. Instead, it makes more
sense for companies whose managers
are focused exclusively on accounting
earnings to make investment decisions
using whatever accounting tax rates
their managers expect their companies
to incur on the earnings generated

by those investments. Unfortunately,
we simply do not know what MNCs’
ETRs are in specific markets, much
less how they differ based on where the
company is domiciled. Without any
studies to rely on, any conclusion about
whether inversions lower marketspecific ETRs in specified identified
markets is shaky.32

offset by the costs of non-U.S.-domiciled MNC competitors complying
with their home-country anti-abuse
regimes, which are sometimes viewed
as stricter and more costly to obey
than the more porous U.S. anti-abuse
rules.36

CASH FLOWS
I now examine the after-tax cash flow
consequences of inverting, as finance
theory emphasizes cash flows, not
earnings. There is strong evidence that
U.S. companies incur costs from holding their cash overseas to avoid repatriation taxes.33 The 2004-2005 tax
holiday that reduced the maximum
repatriation tax rate from 35 percent
to 5.25 percent saw 843 U.S. MNCs
repatriate in aggregate $362 billion
(of which $312 billion was subject to
the reduced holiday tax rate).34 Such
large and widespread repatriations are
inconsistent with the notion that it is
costless for U.S. MNCs to maintain
foreign cash balances that remain subject to taxation. If it were costless for
companies to keep repatriated earnings overseas, presumably they would
have forgone repatriation during the
holiday.35 At the same time, there is
a lack of evidence that those costs are

Critics of inversions need to appreciate the differences between the U.S.
tax system (worldwide with deferral) and most other large country tax
systems (territorial), as well as the
arguments for inversions laid out
in this Issue Brief. They also should
acknowledge that the decline in inversions in recent years is not because the
tax benefits of foreign domicile have
been eliminated, but rather because
of changes in U.S. law that penalize
U.S. MNCs for inverting and fear of
becoming the subject of a tweet from
President Trump that could send a
company’s stock price plummeting.
Policymakers who ignore this state of
affairs are likely to adopt policies that
produce adverse effects.
Inversions indicate that something
is fundamentally wrong with the U.S.
tax system, and there are two obvious
and feasible paths forward. The first
path is more holistic. It would involve

An Analysis of Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International Tax,” 66 Nat’l Tax J. 671, 685 (2013) (estimating
the marginal cost of deferral after 10 years at 7 percent).
34 Melissa Redmiles, “One-Time Received Dividend Deduction,” 27 SOI Bull. 103 (2008).
35 The economic literature on the repatriation holiday focuses
on how the repatriated funds were used. See, e.g., Jennifer
L Blouin and Linda K. Krull, “Bringing It Home: A Study
of the Incentives Surrounding the Repatriation of Foreign
Earnings Under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,”
47 J. Acct Res. 1027 (2009); Dhammika Dhamapala, C.

Fritz Foley, and Kristin J. Forbes, “Watch What I Do, Not
What I Say: The Unintended Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act,” 66 J. Fin. 753 (2011); and Thomas
J. Brennan,” What Happens After a Holiday? Long-Term
Effects of the Repatriation Provision of the AJCA,” 5 Nw. JL
& Soc. Pol’y 1 (2010).
36 Robinson, Testimony, supra note 14 (noting that we lack the
studies that would allow us to compare the costs of being
subject to different anti-abuse regimes).

POLICY PATHS FORWARD

NOTES
before the inversion); but see Rita Nevada Gunn & Thomas
Z. Lys, “The Paradoxical Impact of Corporate Inversions on
US Tax Revenue (working paper August 21, 2016) (arguing
that inversions increase U.S. taxes because firms pay as
much in tax, but shareholders pay more).
31 In at least two inversions (IHS, which merged with the U.K.’s
Markit, and Burger King, which merged with Canada’s Tim
Hortons), management said it expected little change in ETR
following the transaction.
32 Robinson, Testimony, supra note 14.
33 Harry Grubert & Roseanne Altshuler, “Fixing the System:
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tightening U.S. anti-abuse rules in
order to stop earnings stripping as
a preliminary step in the process of
laying the foundation for a future
territorial system. Once stricter
rules are in place, the U.S. could
then lower corporate tax rates and
officially adopt a territorial system.
The U.S. will never convince the rest
of the world to go back to a system
of worldwide taxation, which means
competitiveness concerns will persist
as long as the U.S. seeks to tax the

active foreign income of U.S.-domiciled MNCs.
The second path is less robust, in
that it does not address the competitiveness motivations for inverting.
The U.S. could lower the corporate
tax rate for foreign earned income
only and eliminate deferral. Such an
approach would leave U.S. MNCs
at a competitive disadvantage and
hence would continue to encourage
both inversions and foreign acquisitions of U.S. corporations, but it

7

would eliminate the incentive for
U.S. firms to accumulate earnings
overseas. If policymakers follow
this route, the new rate they set will
answer the question, intentionally
or not, how the United States balances the revenue from taxing the
overseas earnings of U.S. multinationals against the value of leveling
the playing field between U.S. and
foreign corporations in overseas
markets. In the end, policymakers
will have to set that balance.
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